We propose a theoretical model based on the bank lending channel to assess the ability of lending facilities and swap programmes to a¤ect the credit interest rate. The model predicts the success of both unconventional monetary measures in reducing the credit interest rate under very general conditions. The comparison between measures reveals the outperformance of lending facilities over swap programmes if i) the risk premium on the interbank money market is sizeable and the yield on government bonds is low, ii) the share of bank lending obtained from the central bank is below some speci…c threshold, iii) the interest rate o¤ered by the central bank on excess reserves is high, and iv) the default rate on loans is high. The quantitative assessment of the model with real data con…rms the appropriate response of the Federal Reserve in recent crisis episodes but sheds some doubts on the European Central Bank intervention.
Introduction
In the face of severe dislocations in …nancial markets and profound declines in economic activity, monetary authorities have taken extraordinary measures beyond lowering shortterm policy rates using the size and structure of their balance sheets (Borio and Disyatat, 2010 ; Durré and Pill, 2012) . These alternative measures have been adopted for two main reasons. First, nominal short-term interest rates reached the lower bound during this period in many countries, losing their ability to stimulate the economy (Reifschneider and Williams, 2000) . Second, disruptions in the …nancial system generated large losses and a¤ected the liquidity and solvency of both banks and borrowers.
One noteworthy example of an unconventional monetary policy (UMP, hereafter) is the Maturity Extension Program carried out by the Federal Reserve (FED) and consisting of sterilized operations, buying long-term Treasuries and, simultaneously, selling some of the short-term issues. The FED also followed a large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programme of mortgage-backed securities with the aim of increasing market liquidity and reducing mortgage interest rates (credit easing). Nevertheless, the most popular LSAP across monetary authorities in the recent crisis has been the so-called quantitative easing (QE), based on the creation of money to buy assets. While the FED bought Treasuries, agency debt and agency-backed mortgage securities, the Bank of England purchased government bonds from the non-bank private sector. Although the main objective was in both cases to a¤ect yields on assets, the European Central Bank (ECB) used QE to mitigate liquidity problems within the banking system. More speci…cally, it carried out repurchase agreements providing long-term loans in exchange for bank loans and non-government bonds.
The e¤ectiveness of these UMPs which aim to restore the functioning of the …nancial system has been an object of debate since their inception (Joyce et al., 2012) . Nevertheless, their in ‡uence on credit markets and the real economy are not well understood yet. Lenza et al. (2010) argue that QE mainly a¤ected interest rates -in particular, money market spreads -rather than only generating quantitative e¤ects in the money supply. These authors also discuss alternative channels through which UMPs can be transmitted into the economy. In this respect, non-standard measures can in ‡uence bank lending through the expansion of the monetary base, the level of the overnight interest rate determining the access to liquidity in the money market or the expectations about the path of future policy decisions that a¤ect the slope of the money market yield curve. It is worth noting that despite the success of these measures in restoring stability to the …nancial sector and the ‡ow of credit to …nancial markets through the above-mentioned mechanisms borrowing costs have not fallen to levels commensurate with the magnitude of the measures implemented by the monetary authorities. Cukierman (2013) also notes the importance of this anomaly and suggests that it is yet to be determined whether the transmission of monetary policy to commercial banks'lending rates di¤ers between normal times and periods of distress.
The aim of this paper is to analyze this anomaly in detail. In particular, we aim to study the success of the main UMP measures proposed by policy makers for restoring the provision of credit by commercial banks. In order to do this, we investigate the e¤ect of two major UMP measures -lending facilities and swap programmes -on the credit interest rate and its spread with the short-term policy rate. We consider the bank lending channel as their main transmission mechanism to credit interest rates. More speci…cally, we propose a model in which banks maximize a static pro…t function constructed from their balance sheets. In our theoretical framework, the main decision variable of commercial banks is the optimal amount of lending to the non…nancial sector. Banks' balance sheets incorporate realistic features of their assets and liabilities sides. On the asset side, we consider the possibility for commercial banks to set aside funds with the central bank as excess reserves earning an interest rate greater than the interest rate o¤ered to minimum reserves. On the liability side, we contemplate the existence of an interbank money market in which commercial banks borrow and lend funds at a given interest rate, and also the existence of deposits from customers.
In this model, the credit interest rate is obtained from equilibrium conditions. Therefore, the demand of loans by the non-…nancial sector is assumed to depend on economic activity (output). The supply side of the credit market is given by the aggregate supply of loans by commercial banks. This quantity is obtained as the sum over all commercial banks of their optimal loan supply, which is obtained from their pro…t maximization behavior. As a consequence, we incorporate the extent of competition in the loan market as an additional variable with an e¤ect on the equilibrium credit interest rate.
We explore the equilibrium credit interest rate under three di¤erent scenarios: a baseline characterized by the inaction of the central bank, the creation of lending facilities and the implementation of swap programmes. First, we compare each UMP against the baseline model given by inaction of the central bank. In this case, our model predicts that lending facilities are appropriate measures for reducing the credit interest rate when the assets held by banks as collateral lose their value and when the risk premium on the interbank money market is high. Otherwise, the implementation of lending facilities may raise borrowing costs for the non-…nancial sector more than in the baseline case. The comparison of swap programmes with the baseline model predicts the success of swap programmes in reducing the credit interest rate with central bank's inaction if the return o¤ered by government bonds to commercial banks as a result of swap programmes is higher than the return provided by the collateral assets on defaulted loans. Second, we compare the performance between lending facilities and swap programmes. We show that lending facilities outperform swap programmes when i) the risk premium on the interbank money market is sizeable and the yield on government bonds is low, ii) the share of bank lending obtained from the central bank is not very large 1 , iii) the interest rate o¤ered by the central bank on excess reserves is high, and iv) the default rate on loans is high. Otherwise swap programmes are more successful than lending facilities in reducing the credit interest rate.
We also carry out a quantitative assessment of the proposed model with real data from the United States (US) and the euro area (EA). In both cases the simulated equilibrium outcomes provide ample support for the implementation of swap programmes to reduce the credit interest rate with respect to the baseline scenario. This exercise raises, however, important concerns on the success of lending facilities. In particular, we observe that in market conditions such as those in the EA, lending facilities would only be able to reduce the credit interest rate beyond that in the baseline model if the spread between the interbank money market and the o¢ cial interest rate is larger than the return obtained from collateral assets, the reward on excess reserves and the amount of credit borrowed from the central bank.
The present paper is related to Brei et al. (2013) The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a partial equilibrium model for the credit market that takes into account the balance sheet structure of commercial banks, the probability of loan default and the existence of an interbank money market. The competition faced by commercial banks is determined by the number of banks N in the system. In fact, the extent of competition is one of the drivers of the credit interest rate in equilibrium. The rest of interest rates in the banks'pro…t maximization problem are considered to be exogenously determined. This assumption implicitly entails a price taking behavior by commercial banks on the interbank money market and the customer deposits market. The o¢ cial interest rate and the interest rate on excess reserves held in the central bank are set by the latter, who is the monopolistic supplier of the monetary base.
The model is stated as follows. The commercial bank's balance sheet satis…es that
The asset side is comprised by the amount of loans granted to the non-…nancial sector, and denoted as Q B=N B , the level of minimum reserves R min imposed by central banks as collateral -determined by a maintenance ratio 0 < r < 1 -and the excess reserves ER that commercial banks can hold in central banks as an investment. The liability side is
given by three components. First, the credit obtained from the central bank, denoted as Q CB=B . Second, the net loans obtained from the interbank money market, Q B=B , with B referring the rest of banks operating in the interbank money market. Third, commercial banks receive deposits, D, from customers. The balance sheet (1) provides banks a pro…t that is determined by the di¤erence between the returns on the assets and the interest rate paid on the liabilities. To complete the model, we also contemplate the possibility that a share of the supplied loans defaults. This is modelled by the probability of default p d . In this case, the bank earns a rate from selling the collateral asset. We impose in what follows a set of assumptions that allows us to derive a closed form expression for the optimal supply of loans by commercial banks.
Assumptions:
A.1: Banks are risk neutral. 
where i denotes the gross return derived from loans to the non-…nancial sector, i r is the o¢ cial policy rate, e i r is the gross return paid by the central bank to excess returns, i m is the interbank money market interest rate and i d is the interest rate paid on customer deposits.
Under assumptions A.1-A.4 and the identity condition (1) that implies the condition
the pro…t function (2) can be expressed as
The variable D and the interest rates i m , i r , e i r and i d are exogenously given to the commercial bank. The quantity Q B=N B is the decision variable optimally chosen by the bank. The interest rate i is a random variable that depends on the probability of default by borrowers.
Hence, its expected value is
, with i c the interest rate on the share of loans that is repaid by borrowers and e i c the interest rate obtained from the collateral assets for the proportion of loans that default. In this scenario, the pro…t function (Q B=N B ) is a random variable such that
Rearranging terms, we obtain
The optimal supply of loans by a commercial bank is the result of maximizing the objective function E[ jQ B=N B ] with respect to Q B=N B . The …rst order condition of this problemthat determines the optimal supply of credit by an arbitrary commercial bank in the system -is:
In order to determine the credit interest rate in equilibrium we need to establish the corresponding demand schedule for loans from the non-…nancial sector. For simplicity, we consider this demand to depend on aggregate output Y and to be perfectly inelastic with respect to the credit interest rate 2 :
The assumption that there are N homogeneous commercial banks entails the following equilibrium condition in the loan market:
wich entails the following credit interest rate in equilibrium:
This expression establishes that the loan market interest rate depends on the structure of the liability side of commercial banks'balance sheets. In particular, the parameter , denoting the proportion of banks'loans that is …nanced through the central bank, determines to a large extent the pass-through from the short-term policy rate to the equilibrium interest rate. In contrast, if is close to zero the credit interest rate is mainly determined by the credit conditions in the interbank money market. Perfect competition in the credit market
The equilibrium condition also reveals that the possibility of holding funds with the central bank as excess returns ( > 0) in ‡ates the credit interest rate with respect to the policy rate i r and the interbank money market rate i m .
Further, equation (10) allows us to derive a closed form expression for the spread between the credit interest rate and the short-term policy rate. Simple algebra shows that
This condition reinforces the …ndings discussed before. It is perhaps worth mentioning the e¤ect of the spreads between the interest rate on the collateral and the policy rate ( e i c i r )
on the spread on the credit interest rate. A return on the collateral higher than the policy rate reduces the credit interest rate spread. This …nding suggests that banks are more likely to reduce credit interest rates when the value of their collateral assets is high, such that they are able to recover a signi…cant amount of the investment in case of loan default. This …nding depends, however, on the type of competition in the market for loans.
Optimal credit supply under the implementation of UMPs
Our working hypothesis is that the implementation of UMPs by central banks increases the monetary base. The aim of these measures is to invigorate the balance sheet of commercial banks and, as a consequence, to restore the ‡ow of credit to the non-…nancial sector. In this section, we derive the optimal supply of loans by commercial banks and the equilibrium interest rate under the implementation of two major unconventional monetary policies:
the existence of lending facilities by the monetary authority and the creation of swap programmes that exchanged government bonds for the collateral held by commercial banks on toxic loans.
Central bank lending facilities
The main objective of central bank lending facilities is to provide credit to the non-…nancial sector. Monetary authorities aim to do so by lending funds to commercial banks that are in turn used to restore the pro…tability of their portfolio of toxic assets (defaulted loans).
This strategy results in an increase of the bank's balance sheet. In particular, the lending facilities imply a loan L from the central bank to the commercial bank to cover the bank holdings of toxic assets derived from the defaulted loans. In this scenario the commercial bank's balance sheet satis…es that
Given that the lending facilities are such that
It is worth mentioning that, in contrast to the pro…t function (2) of the baseline model, the return on the loans supplied by the commercial bank is not uncertain. This is because the introduction of lending facilities implies that the bank is able to obtain a return of i c for the entire portfolio of loans. Using the identity provided by the balance sheet (13) and, more speci…cally, noting that Q B=B = Q B=N B + R min + ER Q CB=B D, we obtain:
Under assumptions A.1-A.4, this pro…t function can be expressed as
The optimal supply of loans by a commercial bank under the presence of lending facilities, as those discussed above, is the result of maximizing this function with respect to Q B=N B .
The …rst order condition of this problem yields
Using the same demand equation for loans from the non-…nancial sector, given by (8) , and the presence of N homogeneous commercial banks in the system, we achieve the following expression for the credit interest rate in equilibrium:
Moreover, simple algebra allows us to obtain the spread with respect to the short-term policy rate:
This expression shows that the spread on the credit interest rate is driven by the risk premium on the interbank money market and the possibility of rewarding excess reserves on the central bank. There is an additional term that is determined by the degree of competition in the market for loans and the interest rate charged on the lending facilities.
In the limiting case of perfect competition, the equilibrium interest rate (18) is the same of the baseline model. This …nding suggests that lending facilities are not necessary to boost the credit market when there is strong competition in the market for loans.
The success of lending facilities in reducing the spread can be assessed through a comparison between the equilibrium credit interest rate in (18) and that obtained from inaction of the central bank, characterized by the baseline in (10) . In doing so, we implicitly assume that the risk premium on the interbank money market and the parameters , and are all …xed and exogenously determined in the system. This comparison reveals that the implementation of lending facilities reduces the credit spread below that in the baseline scenario discussed in the previous section if
This condition re ‡ects the adequacy of lending facilities for reducing borrowing costs if the value of the collateral on defaulted loans is low and the risk premium on the interbank money market with respect to the interest rates set by the central bank is high.
Expression (20) is also useful for deriving a condition that determines the maximum amount of credit from the monetary authority that a commercial bank can borrow such that the implementation of lending facilities is still fruitful. More speci…cally, this condition is determined in terms of the parameter that drives the variable Q CB=B :
A similar condition can be obtained with respect to the parameter determining the level of excess reserves.
Government bond purchases
The second UMP under scrutiny in the present paper is the implementation of swap programmes. These measures are characterized by the creation of monetary base by the central bank used to purchase government bonds that are exchanged for commercial banks'troubled assets. As in the previous scenario, we identify 'toxic'assets with defaulted loans and ignore the e¤ects of swap programmes on other assets of the bank's balance sheet. Under this scheme, commercial banks know that they can obtain an interest rate i g -instead of e i c -on their portfolio of defaulted loans
In this scenario, in the event of bank's loan defaults, the balance sheet of the commercial bank becomes
where G = p d Q B=N B denotes the amount of government bonds swapped by the commercial bank in return for the portfolio of defaulted loans. In this case there is no expansion of the bank's balance sheet since the central bank absorbs the toxic assets. The corresponding bank's pro…t maximization problem is 
entail the following pro…t function:
Further algebra shows that this function can be expressed as a quadratic function of
The optimal supply of loans by a commercial bank is the result of maximizing this function with respect to Q B=N B . The …rst order condition of this problem yields
In order to derive the credit interest rate in equilibrium, we aggregate the supply function over the N banks in the system and consider the equibrium condition (9) . The credit interest rate is
The corresponding spread over the short-term policy rate i r can be expressed as
Interestingly, the spread on the credit interest rate is similar to the previous cases. In contrast to expressions (12) and (19), we …nd an additional term that is driven by the di¤erence between the interest rate on government bonds and the policy short rate.
More generally, we can also establish the conditions that determine the relative success of this strategy with respect to the baseline model and the existence of lending facilities. Thus, the comparison of expressions (10) and (28) shows that swap programmes are successful in reducing borrowing costs when the interest rate on government bonds is higher than the return o¤ered by the collateral assets held for defaulted loans. Meanwhile, the comparison of (18) and (28) reveals that the creation of lending facilities reduces the credit spread with respect to the counterpart spread under swap programmes if
This condition is similar to (20) and highlights the importance of the interbank market risk premium in determining credit conditions in the loan market. It also shows the negative in ‡uence that rewarding excess reserves by the central bank may have on borrowing costs.
As we did in expression (21), equation (30) is also useful for determining the maximum amount of credit from the monetary authority that a commercial bank can borrow such that the implementation of swap programmes is still fruitful. In this case, we have
Quantitative model assessment
This section reports a simulation exercise that illustrates the predictions of the theoretical model discussed above.
The main goal is to analyze the supply of credit by commercial banks under the three scenarios described in the preceding sections.
To motivate this quantitative exercise, Figure 1 shows the di¤erences in the dynamics of the o¢ cial and credit interest rates for the United States (US) and the euro area (EA).
The spreads between these interest rates in each economy are also reported. The graphs reveal the presence of upward and downward movements of the o¢ cial interest rate. It is, however, surprising that the dynamics of the spreads for the US and the EA show di¤erent patterns in the wake of the 2007-2008 …nancial turmoil. Whereas the US credit spread decreases after the crisis to 3% and remains constant afterwards, the credit spread corresponding to the EA displays a signi…cant increase in the aftermath of the crisis and follows an upward trend from 2010 onwards. This contrast in the dynamics of the interest rate spreads may be due to the di¤erences in the implementation of UMPs across the two economic areas considered. While the US mainly embarked on exchange programmes to swap troubled assets for government bonds and other risk-free assets, the rescue packages of the EA mainly consisted of creating lending facilities that provided unlimited access to credit from the ECB to …nancial institutions.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
We study the sensitivity of the conditions that characterize the relative performance across Tables 1 and 2 for the US and the EA, respectively.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]
As can be observed in Table 1 , the short-term policy interest rate for the US is 2%, excess reserves are considered to be rewarded at 0:25%. Banks face a common loan default rate of 4% and the net return on the assets held as collateral is 2%. While the fraction of total lending held as excess reserves in the FED is 2%, the corresponding fraction borrowed by commercial banks from it is 3%. Finally, we have chosen an interest rate in the interbank money market of 5% and a return on government bonds of 4%. [Insert Figure 2 about here] Figure 3 presents the results obtained from a similar analysis for the EA. As reported in Table 2 , the initial values that characterize the baseline model in this case are a short-term policy rate of 3% and a reward for reserves in excess of the minimum maintenance ratio of 0:2%. The common loan default rate is equal to 4% and the net return on the collateral for the non-performing assets is 2%. The fraction of total lending held as excess reserves by commercial banks is 1%, the interbank money market interest rate is 5% and the return on government bonds is equal to 4%. Finally, the percentage of the total amount of loans that is borrowed from the ECB is 7%.
The simulation exercise with European data yields similar results to those obtained for the US. The important di¤erence in the amount of money borrowed from the central bank in these two economic areas is re ‡ected in the bottom panels of [Insert Figure 4 about here]
The simulation exercise with European data suggests a poor performance of lending facilities in reducing borrowing costs. In particular, condition (21) is violated for low values of credit supply if the return on the collateral is 2%. A higher value of this parameter (3%) results in stronger rejections of this UMP as a valid instrument for easing access to credit.
Similarly, the graph at the bottom right of Figure 4 provides overwhelming evidence of the outperformance of swap programmes over lending facilities raising some doubts about the suitability of the lending facilities created by the ECB during recent crisis episodes.
Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed a simple theoretical framework to evaluate the success of the most important UMPs implemented by central banks during the recent crisis episodes. The spread between the credit interest rate and the short-term policy rate is determined by the risk premium in the interbank money market, the composition of commercial banks'balance sheets, the value of the assets held as collateral for defaulted loans and the default rate on the portfolio of loans. The degree of competition in the banking sector and the amount of excess reserves maintained in the central bank also play a key role in determining the credit interest rate in equilibrium.
The proposed model predicts that lending facilities are appropriate measures for reducing the credit interest rate when the assets held by banks as collateral lose their value and when the risk premium on the interbank money market is high. Similarly, the analysis of swap programmes predicts its success in reducing the credit interest rate if government bond yields are higher than the return provided by the collateral assets on defaulted loans. We have also compared the relative performance between these UMP measures. Our results
show that lending facilities outperform swap programmes when the risk premium on the interbank money market is sizeable and the yield on government bonds is low and when the share of bank lending obtained from the central bank is not very large. More speci…cally, we observe that the greater the reliance of the banking sector on central bank lending during normal periods the more di¢ cult it becomes for lending facilities to reduce the credit interest rate. Further, lending facilities will be a better alternative to reduce the credit interest rate Table 1 ).
Figure 3: Credit supply curves: Baseline (black), lending facilities (red) and swap programmes (blue) scenarios. E¤ects of increases in model parameters (solid to dotted) …tting EA data (see Table 2 ). 
